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BEYOND UPJOHN: ACHIEVING CERTAINTY BY
EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF THE CORPORATE
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
INTRODUCTION
Courts have recognized the difficulty in delineating the boundaries
of the attorney-client privilege in the corporate context.' In order to
establish a claim of attorney-client privilege, it is necessary to
determine whether a communication to counsel is made in
confidence2 and for the purpose of seeking legal advice. 3 Because a
corporation acts only through agents, 4 however, it is also necessary to
discern which of these agents may make privileged disclosures to
corporate counsel. '5 The courts have established a myriad of
conflicting "tests" to determine whether a corporate employee is
empowered to speak for the corporation. Most courts have adopted
1. E.g., Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 602 (8th Cir. 1977); SEC
v. Gulf & W. Indus., 518 F. Supp. 675, 680 (D.D.C. 1981); American Cyanamid
Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 211 F. Supp. 85, 88 (D. Del. 1962); D.I. Chadbourne,
Inc. v. Superior Court, 60 Cal. 2d 723, 732-35, 388 P.2d 700, 706-08, 36 Cal. Rptr.
468, 474-76 (1964) (en bane).
2. Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 1981);
Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 323 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963); In re LTV See. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 603-04 (N.D.
Tex. 1981); 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2292, at 554 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). It
is the communication, not the information contained therein, that must be kept
confidential to retain the privilege. In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litig., 81 F.R.D. 377,
389 (D.D.C. 1978). The client's intent to keep the information confidential is suffi-
cient to retain the privilege. See Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 602
(8th Cir. 1977); Baxter Travenol Laboratories, Inc. v. Lemay, 89 F.R.D. 410, 414
(S.D. Ohio 1981); In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litig., 81 F.R.D. 377, 388-89 (D.D.C.
1978); International Bus. Machs. Corp. v. Sperry Rand Corp., 44 F.R.D. 10, 12 (D.
Del. 1968).
3. Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 602 (8th Cir. 1977); Radiant
Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 323 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 929 (1963); SEC v. Gulf & W. Indus., 518 F. Supp. 675, 681 (D.D.C. 1981).
Business advice is not covered by the privilege. See United States v. Rosenstein, 474
F.2d 705, 714-15 (2d Cir. 1973) (attorney's correspondence directing client to be-
come involved in business deals not privileged); United States v. Vehicular Parking,
Ltd., 52 F. Supp. 751, 7,53 (D. Del. 1943) (letters from an attorney who also acted as
corporate director, promoter and business manager to his corporate client were not
privileged).
4. Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 608 (8th Cir. 1977) (en bane);
D.I. Chadbourne v. Superior Court, 60 Cal. 2d 723, 732, 388 P.2d 700, 706, 36 Cal.
Rptr. 468, 474 (1964) (en bane).
5. This Note makes no distinction, as far as privilege issues are concerned,
between in-house and outside counsel retained by the corporation. For analyses of
the additional problems posed by in-house counsel, see Simon, The Attorney-Client
Privilege as Applied to Corporations, 65 Yale L.J. 953, 970-73 (1956); Note, The
Lawyer-Client Privilege: Its Application to Corporations, the Role oJ Ethics, and Its
Possible Curtailment, 56 Nw. U. L. Rev. 235, 244-48 (1961) [hereinafter cited as The
Lawyer-Client Privilegej.
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either the control group test,6 which focuses on the job title of the
employee-communicator, or variations of the subject matter test, 7
which focuses on the content of the information disclosed to counsel.
Some courts have adopted criteria other than those of the various
control group or subject matter tests.8
The lack of any uniform privilege standard has injected unnecessary
uncertainty into both corporate attorney-client relations and judicial
6. E.g., United States v. Amerada Hess Corp., 619 F.2d 980, 986-87 (3d Cir.
1980); United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223, 1226-28 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd,
449 U.S. 383 (1981); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1237 (3d Cir.
1979); Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. United States Dep't of the Air Force, 566 F.2d 242,
253 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (dictum); Jarvis, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 84
F.R.D. 286, 291-92 (D. Colo. 1979); Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Sun Shipbuild-
ing & Dry Dock Co., 68 F.R.D. 397, 400 (E.D. Va. 1975); Burlington Indus. v.
Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 35-36 (D. Md. 1974); United States v. International Bus.
Machs. Corp., 66 F.R.D. 154, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Honeywell, Inc. v. Piper
Aircraft Corp., 50 F.R.D. 117, 120 (M.D. Pa. 1970); Congoleum Indus. v. GAF
Corp., 49 F.R.D. 82, 84 (E.D. Pa. 1969), aJf'd. inem., 478 F.2d 1398 (3d Cir. 1973);
Garrison v. General Motors Corp., 213 F. Supp. 515, 520 (S.D. Cal. 1963); cf.
Perrignon v. Bergen Brunswig Corp., 77 F.R.D. 455, 459 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (adopted
both control group and subject matter tests).
7. E.g., Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 609 (8th Cir. 1978) (en
bane); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 491-92 (7th Cir.
1970), a'ffd mem. by an equally divided Court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971); In re Ampicillin
Antitrust Litig., 81 F.R.D. 377, 385 (D.D.C. 1978); Sylgab Steel & Wire Corp. v.
Imoco-Gateway Corp., 62 F.R.D. 454, 456 (N.D. Ill. 1974), aJfd mern., 534 F.2d
330 (7th Cir. 1976); Hasso v. Retail Credit Co., 58 F.R.D. 425, 428 (E.D. Pa. 1973);
Rockwell Mfg. Co. v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 57 F.R.D. 111, 112-13 (N.D.
II. 1972); Panduit Corp. v. Burndy Corp., 172 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 46, 47 (N.D. Ill.
1971); D.I. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior Court, 60 Cal. 2d 723, 736-38, 388 P.2d
700, 709-10, 36 Cal. Rptr. 468, 477-78 (1964) (en bane).
8. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D.
Mass. 1950). The United Shoe test provides that "'[t]he privilege applies only if (1) the
asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; (2) the person to
whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his
subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3)
the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his
client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily
either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal
proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the
privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client." Id. Several courts
have adopted this test. E.g., SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D. 508, 520, 522
(D. Conn.), appeal dismissed and mandamus denied per curiamn, 534 F.2d 1031 (2d
Cir. 1976); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 193 F. Supp. 251, 252
(N.D.N.Y. 1960); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 121 F. Supp. 792, 794
(D. Del. 1954). The District Court for the Southern District of New York, in
Wonneman v. Stratford Sec. Co., 23 F.R.D. 281 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), adopted another
alternative test which provides that the privilege exists "'where legal advice of any
kind is sought from a professional legal advisor in his capacity as such, the communi-
cations relevant to that purpose, made in confidence by the client, are at his instance
permanently protected from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor except the
protection be waived." Id. at 285.
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decisions. Indeed, in Upjohn Co. v. United States,0 the Supreme
Court' ° advocated a case-by-case approach to corporate
attorney-client privilege law and declined to formulate any specific
criteria," despite the continuing uncertainty and confusion wrought
by the lack of guidance by the Court. 12 Upjohn and its progeny 3
have left corporate counsel unable to determine whether
communications made to them will be afforded protection from
disclosure. 14
This Note argues that due to the complex nature of corporate
litigation 15 and the frequent need for corporate counsel to conduct
9. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
10. Id. at 385. Unfortunately, the absence of dissenters from the Upjohn opinion
does not signal a definitive resolution to the scope of the corporate attorney-client
privilege problem. The Upjohn holding is restricted to its facts, id. at 386, 397, and
by the Court's own admission, does not "lay down a broad rule or series of rules to
govern all conceivable future questions" concerning the scope of the privilege. Id. at
386.
11. In answer to the requests of the many amici who asked the Court to set forth
a definitive test, e.g., Memorandum of the American Bar Association as Amicus
Curiae at 2; Brief Amici Curiae on Behalf of the American College of Trial Lawyers
at 3; Memorandum of the Chicago Bar Association as Amicus Curiae at 2, Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, stated that "[w]hile such a 'case-by-case' basis
may to some slight extent undermine desirable certainty in the boundaries of the
attorney-client privilege, it obeys the spirit of [the federal rule governing privileges]."
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 396-97 (1981).
12. Scholars have suggested the need for a "bright line" test to determine the
boundaries of the attorney-client privilege. Note, Attorney-Client Privilege Jor Cor-
porate Clients: The Control Group Test, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 424, 426 (1970) [hereinaf-
ter cited as The Control Group Test]; Note, The Corporate Attorney-Client Privi-
lege: Alternatives to the Control Group Test, 12 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 459, 478 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Alternatives to the Control Group Test]; see 2 J. Weinstein & M.
Berger, Weinstein's Evidence 503(b)[04], at 503-47 to -49 (2d ed. 1980) (rejecting a
case-by-case analysis and formulating an alternative test); Note, The Attorney-Client
Privilege in the Corporate Setting: A Suggested Approach, 69 Mich. L. Rev. 360, 379
(1970) (proposing an alternate test) [hereinafter cited as A Suggested Approach]; The
Lawyer-Client Privilege, supra note 5, at 259-60 (proposing a statute to govern
privilege questions). Chief Justice Burger, chastising his brethren for the ambiguities
in Upjohn, noted that '[i]ndeed, because Federal Rule of Evidence 501 provides that
the law of privileges 'shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they
may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and
experience,' this Court has a special duty to clarify aspects of the law of privileges
properly before us." Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 403-04 (1981)
(Burger, C.J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
13. See Baxter Travenol Laboratories, Inc. v. Lemay, 89 F.R.D. 410, 413-14
(S.D. Ohio 1981) (disclosures to a corporate employee serving as a litigation consul-
tant are privileged); In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 618-21 (N.D. Tex. 1981)
(material garnered by a "Special Officer" hired to implement a Securities and
Exchange Commission consent decree is privileged).
14. Baxter Travenol Laboratories, Inc. v. Lemay, 89 F.R.D. 410, 413 (S.D.
Ohio 1981).
15. Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 940, 1000-07 (1961)
[hereinafter cited as Developments-Discovery]. Corporate litigation in the privilege
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internal investigations,' 6 some definitive guidelines for the privilege
must be established. Part I of this Note discusses the development of
the corporate attorney-client privilege and its underlying policy
rationales. Part II analyzes Upjohn and its progeny, and examines the
consequences of the absence of guidelines on corporate litigation and
internal investigations. Part III discusses the tension between the
privilege and liberalized discovery and argues that an expansion of the
scope of the attorney-client privilege would not substantially impede
discovery. This Note proposes that, to better serve the theoretical
underpinnings of the attorney-client privilege, the scope of the
corporate attorney-client privilege should be expanded to encompass
the communications of all of a corporation's employees.
I. THE HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND OF
CORPORATE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
A. The Development of the Attorney-Client Privilege
Rooted in principles of ancient Roman law,", the attorney-client
privilege originated during the reign of Elizabeth 1. 18 The privilege,
area often involves hundreds of documents, e.g., Permian Corp. v. United States,
665 F.2d 1214, 1215-17 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("millions" of documents), In re Ampicillin
Antitrust Litig., 81 F.R.D. 377, 382 (D.D.C. 1978) (over 745 documents): Bur-
lington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 32 (D. Md. 1974) ("approximately 720
documents"); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of Am.. 121 F. Supp. 792, 793 (D.
Del. 1954) ("some 1600 documents"): United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89
F. Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass. 1950) ("nearly 800 exhibits"), and the consolidation of
multiple actions. E.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 489
(7th Cir. 1970) (per curiam) ("more than forty separate antitrust actions brought in
eight judicial districts"), aff'd mem. by an equally divided Court, 400 U.S. 348
(1971); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1156 (D.S.C.
1974) ("22 parties involved").
16. See generally Block & Barton, Internal Corporate Investigations: Maintain-
ing the Confidentiality of a Corporate Client's Communications with Investigative
Counsel, 35 Bus. Law. 5 (1979) (discussing the corporate attorney-client privilege
problems attendant to internal investigations with emphasis on securities-related
investigations).
17. See Radin, The Privilege of Confidential Communications Between Lawyer
and Client, 16 Calif. L. Rev. 487, 487-89 (1928). Under Roman law, a servant's duty
of loyalty was prescribed. A slave was incompetent to testify against his master.
Likewise, an advocate was prohibited from bearing witness against his client while
the case was in progress, and, under later law, was made incompetent to testify at
all. Id. at 488-89. The general moral duty not to violate the fides upon which such
relationships were built was held paramount to the policy that sought the correct
settlement of controversies. Id. at 490. Although the connection between this ancient
precedent and the 16th century English concept of the privilege cannot be proven,
Professor Radin posits that the early precedent may have had some influence on the
English barrister's obligation to protect his client's disclosures. Id. at 488.
18. 9 W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 201-02 (1926): 8 J. Wigmore,
supra note 2, § 2290, at 542 & n.1. Wigmore contends that by the reign of Elizabeth
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based on the barrister's code of honor, was premised on the notion
that a gentleman could not be forced to reveal entrusted secrets. '9 The
early cases held that the barrister's privilege was absolute. 20  By the
eighteenth century, however, courts began to regard the client's inter-
est as more important than professional dignity. 21 Underlying this
shift of emphasis from the attorney to the client, was a general notion
that "the law had reached such a state of complexity"22 that justice
I, the privilege was already unquestioned. Id. Contra Hazard, An Historical Perspec-
tive on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 Calif. L. Rev. 1061, 1070 (1978) ("the
historical foundations of the privilege are not as firm as the tenor of Wigmore's
language suggests"). Many early English cases upheld the privilege. E.g., Bulstrod v.
Letchmere, 22 Eng. Rep. 1019, 1019 (Ch. 1676) ("the defendant, being a counsellor
at law, shall not be bound to answer ...for any thing which he knoweth in the
cause as counsellor"); Waldron v. Ward, 82 Eng. Rep. 853, 853 (K.B. 1654) (coun-
sellor "not bound to make answer for things which may disclose the secrets of his
clients cause"); Berd v. Lovelace, 21 Eng. Rep. 33, 33 (Ch. 1577) (solicitor "shall not
be compelled to be deposed").
19. 8 J. Wigmore, upra note 2, § 2290, at 543; Gardner, A Re-Evaluation of the
Attorney-Client Privilege (pt. I), 8 Vill. L. Rev. 279, 289 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
Gardner I]. The original privilege only belonged to the barrister, not to the attorney
or solicitor. Hazard, supra note 18, at 1071; see Gardner I, supra, at 289. While
barristers were considered members of "an ancient and honorable class," id., who
were not merely officers of the court but members of it, Hazard, supra note 18, at
1071, attorneys and solicitors were not members of the court, id. at 1071 n.39, and
were not as highly regarded. Gardner I, supra, at 289. The privilege itself was based
on an oath of honor. 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 2, § 2290, at 543; see Gardner I,
supra, at 292 ("Eighteenth century rationalism resulted in the notion that the silence
of the attorney was necessary in order that the client might trust his legal advisor
more fully."); Hazard, supra note 18, at 1071 ("A barrister ...could no more
properly be asked to reveal a client's confidences than a modern judge could be asked
to disclose matters heard in camera.").
20. See, e.g., Sparke v. Middleton, 83 Eng. Rep. 1079, 1079 (K.B. 1664);
Waldron v. Ward, 82 Eng. Rep. 853, 853 (K.B. 1654); see Gardner I, supra note 19,
at 289. But cf. Hazard, supra note 18, at 1071-73 (lawyer's testimony deemed
admissible in a majority of early cases).
21. C. McCormick, McCormick's Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 87, at 175
(E. Cleary 2d rev. ed. 1972); 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 2, § 2290, at 543; see 9 W.
Holdsworth, supra note 18, at 202. The reasons for the shift in policy rationale are
unclear, and commentators posit varied explanations for the change: that the discov-
ery rules expanded, Gardner I, supra note 19, at 293-95; that eighteenth century
rationalists required sounder policy justifications, id. at 291-92, including the need to
provide "subjectively for the client's freedom from apprehension," 8 J. Wigmore,
supra note 2, J 2290, at 543; and that the privilege was extended to attorneys, who,
unlike barristers, were not members of the court. Hazard, supra note 18, at 1071
n.39. The "honor of the barrister" rationale coexisted with the newer theoretical
justifications until the mid-eighteenth century. 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 2, § 2290,
at 543.
22. The Lawyer-Client Privilege, supra note 5, at 235; accord Anderson v. Bank
of B.C., 2 Ch. D. 644, 649 (Ch. 1876); Greenough v. Gaskell, 39 Eng. Rep. 618, 620
(Ch. 1833). Under the newer policy rationales, the privilege belonged to the client. 9
W. Holdsworth, supra note 18, at 202. It was not until 1873 that the client was fully
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could be served only if the advocate was fully apprised of his client's
case.
23
This policy rationale remains the underpinning of present-day at-
torney-client privilege theory. American commentators 24 and courts
likewise view the privilege as a means to foster client confidence and
encourage full factual disclosure to an attorney. They argue that free
communication facilitates justice 26 by promoting proper case prepara-
tion.27  It is also suggested that frivolous litigation is discouraged
when, based on full factual disclosure, an attorney finds that his
client's case is not a strong one.
2 8
The attorney-client privilege prevents the disclosure of privileged
communications29 and promotes a full and free exchange of informa-
protected by the privilege both at law and in equity. Gardner I. supra note 19, at
298-99.
23. Anderson v. Bank of B.C., 2 Ch. D. 644, 649 (Ch. 1876): Annesley v.
Anglesea, 17 How. St. Tr. 1129, 1237 (Ex. 1743).
24. 2 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence § 207, at 505-07 (1978);
Gardner I, supra note 19, at 310-11: Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and
Confusion: Privileges in Federal Court Today, 31 Tul. L. Rev. 101, 111-13 (1956):
see 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 2, § 2291.
25. E.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981): Hunt v.
Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888); SEC v. Gulf & W. Indus., 518 F. Supp. 675,
680 (D.D.C. 1981).
26. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); Hunt v. Blackburn,
128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487,
492 (7th Cir. 1970) (per curiam), aff'd mer. by an equally divided Court, 400 U.S.
348 (1971); Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686, 691 (10th Cir. 1968): Radiant Burners,
Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 321-22 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
929 (1963); In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litig., 81 F.R.D. 377, 383 (D.D.C. 1978);
The Lawyer-Client Privilege. supra note 5, at 241; cf. Radin, supra note 17, at 492
(the attorney-client privilege ultimately serves to make men equal before the law).
27. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); Trammel v.
United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89
F. Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass. 1950); C. McCormick, supra note 21, § 87, at 176;
Gardner I, supra note 19, at 310-11.
28. See Gardner I, supra note 19, at 292 n.43: Radin, supra note 17, at 491.
29. E.g., Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888): United States v.
Amerada Hess Corp., 619 F.2d 980, 986 (3d Cir. 1980): Diversified Indus. v.
Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 601 (8th Cir. 1977); Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d
855, 856 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956); C. McCormick, supra note 21,
§ 87, at 177; 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 2, § 2291, at 545; cf. Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 492 (7th Cir. 1970) ("appeal after disclo-
sure of the privileged communication is an inadequate remedy"), aff'd iner. by an
equally divided Court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971). As the Supreme Court noted in Connect-
icut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S. 457 (1877), "-[i]f a person cannot consult
his legal adviser without being liable to have the interview made public the next day
by an examination enforced by the courts, the law would be little short of despotic."
Id. at 458. The protection extends to both communications from the client to the
attorney, and to those from the attorney to the client. United States v. Margolis, 557
F.2d 209, 211 (9th Cir. 1977); Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686, 692-93 (10th Cir.
1968); Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855, 863 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352
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tion between an attorney and his client, 30 thereby facilitating effective
legal representation. 31 Given that the privilege prevents disclosure of
communications during discovery and at trial, 32 however, many
courts33 and commentators 34 have argued that an expansive privilege
runs counter to the modern trend of liberalized discovery.35  Too
restrictive a privilege, however, will defeat the very purposes of the
doctrine; without the privilege's protection, the incentive to commu-
nicate with counsel disappears.
U.S. 833 (1956); In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 602-03 (N.D. Tex. 1981); In
re Ampicillin Antitrust Litig., 81 F.R.D. 377, 388 n.20 (D.D.C. 1978); 2 J. Wein-
stein & M. Berger, supra note 12, 503(b)[03], at 503-39; 8 J. Wigmore, supra note
2, § 2320, at 628-29.
30. E.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); Fisher v.
United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976); Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470
(1888); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1235 (3d Cir. 1979); Mead
Data Cent., Inc. v. United States Dep't of the Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 252 (D.C.
Cir. 1977); C. McCormick, supra note 21, § 87, at 175; 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 2, §
2291, at 545; Gardner I, supra note 19, at 305; Ladd, Uniform Evidence Rules in the
Federal Courts, 49 Va. L. Rev. 692, 714 (1963); Radin, supra note 17, at 490.
31. E.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); Fisher v.
United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511
(1947); United States v. Louisville & N.R.R., 236 U.S. 318, 336 (1915); Hunt v.
Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888); Chirac v. Reinicker, 24 U.S. 124, 130, 11
Wheat. 280, 294 (1826); Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. United States Dep't of the Air
Force, 566 F.2d 242, 252 (D.C. Cir. 1977); C. McCormick, supra note 21, § 87, at
175-76; Gardner I, supra note 19, at 292, 308-10; Hazard, supra note 18, at 1078-79
(quoting Annesley v. Anglesea, 17 How. St. Tr. 1139, 1237 (1743)).
32. The attorney-client privilege applies during discovery, see, e.g., Upjohn Co.
v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 387-88 (1981); Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American
Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 318 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963); In re LTV
Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 599-600 (N.D. Tex. 1981), and is available at trial. See
City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 205 F. Supp. 830, 831, adhered
to, 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa.), mandamus and prohibition denied sub nom.
General Elec. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S.
943 (1963). The privilege also applies in grand jury proceedings, General Counsel v.
United States, 599 F.2d 504, 509 (2d Cir. 1979); Duffy v. United States, 473 F.2d
840, 841-42 (8th Cir. 1973), and in administrative proceedings. United States v.
Summe, 208 F. Supp. 925, 927 (E.D. Ky. 1962); CAB v. Air Transp. Ass'n, 201 F.
Supp. 318, 318 (D.D.C. 1961).
33. E.g., United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223, 1227 (6th Cir. 1979),
rev'd on other grounds, 449 U.S. 383 (1981); Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572
F.2d 596, 602 (8th Cir. 1977); Jarvis, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 84 F.R.D.
286, 292 (D. Colo. 1979).
34. See, e.g., C. McCormick, supra note 21, § 96, at 202-03; 8 J. Wigmore,
supra note 2, § 2292, at 554; The Control Group Test, supra note 12, at 425-26.
35. Liberalized discovery serves to "make available to each party the widest
possible sources of proof as early as may be so as to avoid surprise and facilitate
preparation," C. McCormick, supra note 21, § 96, at 202, and to limit the scope of
the controversy. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947). For a discussion of
liberalized discovery, see C. Wright, Handbook of the Law of Federal Courts § 81
(3d ed. 1976). This liberal trend is reflected in the discovery rules. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
26-37. Another aim of discovery, the "fair and open adjudication of controversies,"
1982] CORPORATE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE 1189
B. The Federal Rules of Evidence
The Advisory Committee on Federal Evidence Rules, at the direc-
tion of the Supreme Court, 36 addressed the scope of the corporate
attorney-client privilege in devising Proposed Rule of Evidence
503. 37 In the preliminary draft, rule 5-03(a)(3) incorporated the
control group test, 38 limiting the scope of the privilege to representa-
tives of the client "having authority to obtain professional legal serv-
ices, or to act on advice rendered pursuant thereto, on behalf of the
client." 39  The final revised draft, however, eliminated this defini-
tion"° and expressly left clarification of the scope problem for case-law
Note, Upjohn Co. v. United States: Death Knell for the Control Group Test and a
Plea for a Policy-Oriented Standard to Corporate Discovery, 31 Syracuse L. Rev.
1043, 1052 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Death Knell], is generally believed to serve the
public interest. See Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege: Fixed Rules, Balancing, and
Constitutional Entitlement, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 464, 470 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Fixed Rules]; Developments-Discovery, supra note 15, at 1000. Liberal discovery,
however, may impede rather than expedite litigation. Id. (In the " 'big case,' ...
[r]ather than alleviating such conditions, the federal discovery rules have often added
to the complications, burying the parties in a welter of documents, depositions, and
interrogatories."). See generally Discovery Reform Pushed by ABA Committee, 63
A.B.A. J. 1691 (1977) (American Bar Association Litigation Section sought changes
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to curb abusive discovery tactics).
36. See Rules of Evidence: Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on Reform of
Federal Criminal Laws of the House Comm. on the Judiciary on Proposed Rules of
Evidence, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 2 at 13-15 (1973) (testimony of Judge Albert
Marils) [hereinafter cited as Subcommittee Hearings].
37. The preliminary draft of Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 5-03, 46 F.R.D. 161, 249-51
(1969), was first revised to change the disjunctive "or" to the conjunctive "and" in
the definition of "representative of the client" in proposed rule 503(a)(3). Proposed
Fed. R. Evid. 503(a)(3) (revised draft), 51 F.R.D. 315, 361 (1971). All specific
references to the privilege as it applies to corporations were removed in the final
revised draft. Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 503 (final revised draft), 56 F.R.D. 183, 235-
37 (1972).
38. For a discussion of the control group test, see infra notes 50-58, 74-81 and
accompanying text.
39. Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 5-03(a)(3) (preliminary draft), 46 F.R.D. 161, 250
(1969). The Advisory Committee noted that "[t]he rule reflects the trend of recent
decisions." Id. at 252; accord 2 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note 12, J
503(b)[04], at 503-47 ("the control group test seemed to be in clear ascendancy in the
federal courts").
40. Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 503 (final revised draft), 56 F.R.D. 183, 235-37
(1972). The "representative of the client" definition was removed from proposed rule
503 after the Supreme Court affirmed, by a vote of four to four, the Seventh Circuit's
subject matter test formulation in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423
F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970) (per curiam), aff'd mem. by an equally divided Court, 400
U.S. 348 (1971). According to Professor Edward Cleary, "[t]he committee never
receded" from the control group view, but rather decided that after Harper & Row,
the issue "was a little hot to handle." Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 36, at 524
(statement of Prof. Edward Cleary). Charles Halpern and George Frampton, Jr.,
commenting on the revised draft in their memorandum submitted to the House
Subcommittee, noted that "[i]ndeed, the Rules escape even greater controversy sim-
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resolution. 41 Congress, unable to settle on specific privilege criteria,
ultimately rejected even this revised draft 42 and enacted rule 501 .4
The rule provides that when state law does not supply the rule of
decision in an element of a claim or defense, 44 federal privilege law
"shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may
ply by avoiding some of the hardest and most pressing issues in the forefront of
evidence law: the scope of the attorney-client privilege for corporate employees." Id.
at 190 (Memorandum-Additional Submissions, Requested by the Subcommittee-
Feb. 20, 1973).
41. Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 503(a) advisory committee note (final revised draft),
56 F.R.D. 183, 237 (1972). While the committee eliminated the definition of "repre-
sentative of the client" in subdivision (a) of the rule, the phrase remained, undefined,
in subdivision (b) of rule 503. Id. 503(b)(4) (final revised draft), 56 F.R.D. 183, 236
(1972).
42. According to Representative Hungate, Chairman of the House Special Sub-
committee on the Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, "50 percent of the complaints in
our committee related to the section on privileges." Rules of Evidence: Hearings
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on Federal Rules of Evidence: H.R. 5463,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1974) (statement of Rep. Hungate). Opposition to any
codification of specific privilege rules was based on a myriad of reasons: (1) that the
power of the Court to promulgate rules of "substantive" law was questionable, e.g.,
Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 36, at 66 (statement of Rep. Dennis); id. at 147-
52 (statement of Justice Goldberg); id. at 156-57 (statement of Justice Goldberg); id.
at 159 (statement of Charles Halpern on behalf of the Washington Council of
Lawyers); contra id. at 549-54 (reply statement of Prof. Edward Cleary); (2) that
establishing a federal privilege law would improperly abrogate state-created privi-
lege law, e.g., id. at 156-57 (statement of Justice Goldberg); id. at 171-73 (statement
of Charles Halpern and George Frampton, Jr. on behalf of the Washington Council
of Lawyers); id. at 204-05 (statement of George Leisure); id. at 249 (statement of
Chief Judge Henry Friendly); and (3) that the privilege provisions were too complex
to be workable. Id. at 218 (statement of a Committee of New York Trial Lawyers on
the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence). Although most of the controversy sur-
rounded the omission of certain privilege provisions and the inclusion of the unprece-
dented new law of governmental secrecy, id. at 191 (Memorandum -Additional
Submissions, Requested by the Subcommittee-Feb. 20, 1973), there was opposition
to the application of proposed rule 503 to corporations. Id. at 415-18 (statement of
Terry Lenzner and Joseph Gebhardt); id. at 496-97 (statement of Stuart Johnson,
Jr.).
43. Fed. R. Evid. 501.
44. Since the adoption of rule 501, the courts apply federal privilege law in
federal question cases. 2 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, supra note 24, § 201, at 415; e.g.,
United States v. Hankins, 581 F.2d 431, 438 n.13 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 909 (1979); Heathman v. United States District Court, 503 F.2d 1032, 1034 (9th
Cir. 1974); Perrignon v. Bergen Brunswig Corp., 77 F.R.D. 455, 458 (N.D. Cal.
1978) (dictum). In determining the federal law, however, the federal courts may seek
guidance from existing state law, Lewis v. United States, 517 F.2d 236, 237 (9th Cir.
1975) (per curiam); Heathman v. United States District Court, 503 F.2d 1032, 1034
(9th Cir. 1974), and if the federal court adopts the state law, this incorporated
principle becomes federal common law. Lewis v. United States, 517 F.2d 236, 237
(9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8,
reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 7098, 7101. In diversity jurisdiction
cases, courts apply state privilege law. Perrignon v. Bergen Brunswig Corp., 77
F.R.D. 455, 458 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (dictum); see Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. ABC
Records, Inc., 82 F.R.D. 472, 473 (W.D. Tenn. 1979); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1597,
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be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason
and experience."-45 Rule 501 thus represents a compromise between
those who proposed the creation of a specific federal privilege law 46
and those who opposed codification of the venerable common-law
doctrine, 47 in that it calls for the creation of a federal common law.4 1
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 7098, 7101.
In pendent claim cases, the weight of authority states that federal privilege law
governs both the federal and state questions. See. e.g., Dorsten v. Lapeer County
Gen. Hosp., 88 F.R.D. 583, 586 (E.D. Mich. 1980), Perrignon v. Bergen Brunswig
Corp., 77 F.R.D. 455, 459 (N.D. Cal. 1978). But see 2 D. Louisell & C. Mueller,
supra note 24, § 206, at 503 (suggesting that pendent state claim should be dismissed
if state law conflicts with the federal common law). When the state privilege claim is
ancillary to the federal claim, or federal and state claims and defenses are otherwise
mixed, the privilege rule to be applied is unclear. 2 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, supra
note 24, § 206, at 504 (suggesting that separate trials be ordered pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b)); see Garner v. Wolfinbarger. 430 F.2d 1093, 1097,
1100 (5th Cir. 1970) (pre-rule authority indicating that both sets of privilege rules
should be examined), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971).
45. Fed. R. Evid. 501. Although Congress intended that there be no specific
privilege rules, see S. Rep. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7, 11-13, reprinted in
1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 7051, 7052-54, 7058-59; H.R. Rep. No. 650, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 7075,
7082-83, it did examine the pre-rule common law as to specific privileges, including
the attorney-client privilege. See Library of Congress, Current Status of the Law of
Testimonial Privileges in Federal Courts, K. Redden & S. Saltzburg, Federal Rules of
Evidence Manual 202, 203-08 (1975). Despite the fact that Congress rejected the
proposed attorney-client privilege rule, Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 503 (final revised
draft), 56 F.R.D. 183, 235-36 (1972), it still has some persuasive value. See Marshall
v. Fitzsimmons, 27 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1379, 1381 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, Detroit, Mich., Aug. 1977, 434 F. Supp. 648, 650 n.I (E.D.
Mich. 1977), aff'd per curiam, 570 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1978); SCM Corp. v. Xerox
Corp., 70 F.R.D. 508, 522 (D. Conn.), appeal dismissed and mandamus denied per
curiam, 534 F.2d 1031 (2d Cir. 1976); Eutectic Corp. v. Metco, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 35,
38 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); 2 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note 12, i 503[02], at
503-17; Note, The Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence: Of Privileges and the Divi-
sion of Rule-Making Power, 76 Mich. L. Rev. 1177, 1196-1201 (1978).
46. Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 36, at 554 (reply statement of Prof.
Edward Cleary) ("[The following] reasons demonstrate the validity of the proposi-
tions which underlie the basic approach of the proposed rules to the area of privilege:
first, that the Congress does have power to legislate in respect to privilege in diversity
as well as in other cases; second, that this power was delegated to the Court; and
third, that the decision to formulate federal rules of privilege was a wise one.");
Weinstein, The Uniformity-Conformity Dilemma Facing Draftsmen of Federal
Rules of Evidence, 69 Colum. L. Rev. 353 (1969) (advocating adoption of privilege
rules prior to the promulgation of the proposed rules). The original version of
proposed Article V, as drafted by the Advisory Committee, would have created a
distinct federal privilege law to be used in all cases decided under the Federal Rules
of Evidence. See Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 501-13 & advisory notes (final revised
draft), 56 F.R.D. 183, 230-61 (1972).
47. See supra note 18.
48. 2 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, supra note 24, § 200, at 399400. The adoption
of a federal common-law scheme leaves unresolved not only the question of the scope
of the corporate attorney-client privilege, but also leaves undefined the basic require-
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C. The Federal Common Law
Without any definitive congressional mandate as to specific federal
privileges, the federal courts have fashioned a myriad of conflicting
tests. 49 In City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,5° the
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania created the
narrow control group test.-" The court held that the privilege extends
only to an attorney's communications with employees "in a position to
control or even to take a substantial part in a decision about any
action which the corporation may take upon the advice of the attor-
ney." 5 2  The privilege is limited only to communications made by
high-ranking management or to certain other employees who could
"'act upon the lawyer's advice." 53 The court's decision has been inter-
preted to mean that the employee's title must fall within the ambit of
the control group for the communication to be privileged. 4  The
ments necessary to establish a claim of privilege, such as the level of confidentiality
and the type of advice that will be deemed privileged.
49. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
50. 205 F. Supp. 830, adhered to, 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa.), mandamus and
prohibition denied sub nom. General Elec. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 (3d Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963). In Westinghouse, 1,800 civil antitrust
actions were brought against the corporate defendant. 210 F. Supp. at 487. Plaintiffs
moved for an order directing defendants to answer interrogatories concerning mar-
keting and pricing decisions made by corporate officers. 205 F. Supp. at 830. Claim-
ing that discovery was barred by the attorney-client privilege because such informa-
tion was communicated to corporate counsel, the defendant refused to answer. Id. at
830-31. The court denied the claim of privilege. 210 F. Supp. at 486, 491.
51. 210 F. Supp. at 485. Commentators have suggested that Judge Kirkpatrick,
in creating the narrow control group test, was wary of the lower court decision in
Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n., 207 F. Supp. 771, adhered to, 209 F.
Supp. 321 (N.D. Ill. 1962), rev'd, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929
(1963), which held that the privilege does not apply to corporations. Id. at 773; 2 D.
Louisell & C. Mueller, supra note 24, § 212, at 560-61; Kobak, The Uneven Applica-
tion of the Attorney-Client Privilege to Corporations in the Federal Courts, 6 Ga. L.
Rev. 339, 362 (1972); Stern, Attorney-Client Privilege: Supreme Court Repudiates
the Control Group Test, 67 A.B.A. J. 1142, 1143 (1981).
52. 210 F. Supp. at 485.
53. Id. at 486.
54. See, e.g., Hogan v. Zletz, 43 F.R.D. 308, 315 (N.D. Okla. 1967) (control
group includes managers and assistant managers of the patent and research and
development divisions), afJ'd in part sub nom. Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686 (10th
Cir. 1968); Garrison v. General Motors Corp., 213 F. Supp. 515, 518 (S.D. Cal.
1963) (control group is comprised of directors, officers, department heads, division
managers and division chief engineers); cf. United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d
1223, 1227-28 (6th Cir. 1979) (case remanded in part to determine whether the
chairman of the board, vice chairman, president and senior officers are members of
the control group), rev'd on other grounds, 449 U.S. 383 (1981); Congoleum Indus.
v. GAF Corp., 49 F.R.D. 82, 83-85 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (control group includes, at the
lowest level, only vice presidents, yet the court stated that "actual duties and respon-
sibilities" are the criteria for choosing control group members, not "labels or titles"),
afJ'd mem., 478 F.2d L398 (3d Cir. 1973).
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Westinghouse decision has been widely accepted by the courts s5 It
has been praised by commentators as promoting consultation with
counsel, 56 preventing discovery abuses,5 and being an easily applica-
ble "bright-line" test that promotes certainty. 58
In Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker,5 9 however, the Sev-
enth Circuit dismissed the control group test as "not wholly ade-
quate," 60 and proposed the subject matter test.61  In contrast to the
control group test, the Harper & Row approach focuses "upon why an
attorney was consulted, rather than with whom the attorney commu-
nicated."' 62 Under this test, communications to corporate counsel are
privileged when made by an employee at the direction of his superiors
regarding subject matter within the scope of the communicator's em-
ployment. 63
55. Although the Westinghouse control group theory "first was regarded as an
intermediate or compromise position" between the lower court Radiant Burner
decision and the concept of corporate privilege, Stern, supra note 51, at 1143, it soon
became the leading test to determine the scope of the corporate attorney-client
privilege. See cases cited supra note 6.
56. See, e.g., Kobak, supra note 51, at 365-66; The Control Group Test, supra
note 12, at 427.
57. See The Control Group Test, supra note 12, at 429. Courts have also praised
the control group test for preventing discovery abuses. See United States v. Upjohn
Co., 600 F.2d 1223, 1227 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 449 U.S. 383 (1981); Jaris, Inc. v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 84 F.R.D. 286, 291 (D. Colo. 1979).
58. The Control Group Test, supra note 12, at 426, 434-35; see A Suggested
Approach, supra note 12, at 379 (proposing a modified control group test).
59. 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970) (per curiam), aff'd mern. by an equally divided
Court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971). In Harper & Row, more than 40 civil antitrust actions
were brought against 23 defendants for an alleged conspiracy to fix prices of chil-
dren's library books. 423 F.2d at 489. Plaintiffs sought discovery of memoranda
prepared by defendants' counsel while debriefing employees after their grand jury
testimony. Id. at 490. Defendants refused to produce these memoranda, claiming
that they were protected either by the attorney-client privilege or by the work
product immunity doctrine. Id.
60. Id. at 491.
61. Id. at 491-92. The Harper & Row court did not call its test the "subject
matter test." That label was coined by later courts. See United States v. Upjohn Co.,
600 F.2d 1223, 1226-27 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 449 U.S. 383 (1981). Another court
has described the Harper & Row criterion as the "scope of employment rule."
General Counsel v. United States, 599 F.2d 504, 509 (2d Cir. 1979).
62. Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 609 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc);
see Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 491-92 (7th Cir. 1970)
(per curiam), aff'd mem. by an equally divided Court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971).
63. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 491-92 (7th Cir.
1970) (per curiam), aff'd mem. by an equally divided Court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971). A
more detailed eleven-point test was developed by the California Supreme Court in
D.I. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior Court, 60 Cal. 2d 723, 388 P.2d 700, 36 Cal.
Rptr. 468 (1964) (en banc). The Chadbourne test applies only when the employee is
"the natural person to be speaking for the corporation," the employee is more than a
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Although the Harper & Row test was adopted in many cases0 4 and
was generally well received by commentators,"5 subsequent cases have
modified its scope. 66  In Diversified Industries v. Meredith, 7 the
Eighth Circuit, sitting en banc, 6 8 added the requirement that "the
communication [must not be] disseminated beyond those persons
who, because of the corporate structure, need to know its con-
tents."' 69 This additional requirement in essence shifts the test's em-
phasis to whether the communication is strictly confidential.70  The
District Court for the District of Columbia, in In re Ampicillin Anti-
trust Litigation, 71 further modified the subject matter test. The Ampi-
mere independent witness, the employees' statement would be required in the ordi-
nary course of corporate business, and the person intends the communication to be
confidential. Id. at 736-37, 388 P.2d at 709-10, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 477-78.
64. E.g., Sylgab Steel & Wire Corp. v. Imoco-Gateway Corp., 62 F.R.D. 454,
456 (N.D. Ill. 1974), aff'd mem., 534 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1976); Hasso v. Retail
Credit Co., 58 F.R.D. 425, 428 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Rockwell Mfg. Co. v. Chicago
Pneumatic Tool Co., 57 F.R.D. 111, 113 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Panduit Corp. v. Burndy
Corp., 172 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 46, 47 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
65. See, e.g., Kobak, supra note 51, at 367-68; Weinschel, Corporate Employee
Interviews and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 12 B.C. Indus. & Comm. L. Rev. 873,
879 (1971); Alternatives to the Control Group Test, supra note 12, at 465.
66. See Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 609 (8th Cir. 1978) (en
bane) (adopting the modifications suggested in 2 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra
note 12, 503(b)[04], at 503-47 to -49); In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litig., 81 F.R.D.
377, 385 (D.D.C. 1978) (calling for a stricter limitation of the privilege).
67. 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978) (en bane). During a proxy fight, it was discov-
ered that Diversified maintained a "slush fund" to bribe purchasing agents. Id. at
600. The Securities and Exchange Commission's interest in the fund resulted in an
investigation by corporate counsel at the direction of Diversified's board of directors.
Id. The law firm representing Diversified wrote memoranda on its findings. Defend-
ant sought discovery of these memoranda in claims against Diversified for alleged
conspiracy, tortious interference with contractual relationships and violation of § 4 of
the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). 572 F.2d at 600. For commentary on
Diversified, see Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege, the Self-Evaluative Report
Privilege and Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith, 40 Ohio St. L.J. 699 (1979)- ,17
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 413 (1979).
68. The original court of appeals panel held that the memoranda were discover-
able. 572 F.2d at 603. On rehearing en banc, however, the court reversed the panel,
finding the memoranda privileged under a modified Harper & Row test. Id. at 609-
11.
69. Id. at 609.
70. The Eighth Circuit wholly adopted the criteria set forth in 2 J. Weinstein &
M. Berger, supra note 12, 503(b)[04], at 503-47 to -49. Weinstein and Berger note
that the additional confidentiality requirement is necessary to "ensure that routine
business records are not being immunized from discovery by the simple device of
forwarding a copy to counsel," id. at 503-49, and to ensure that the information is
not being " 'circulated unnecessarily in the organization.' " Id. (quoting Simon,
supra note 5, at 985).
71. 81 F.R.D. 377 (D.D.C. 1978). In Ampicillin, plaintiff sought disclosure of
over 700 documents in a consolidated civil antitrust case. Id. at 380. Defendant
refused to produce them on the ground that they were privileged, id. at 380, and the
court upheld the claim of privilege as to some of the documents. Id. at 394.
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cillin court required "a close relationship between the communication
and a decision on the legal problem [that is the subject matter of the
communication] ... rather than a request by a superior to an em-
ployee that the communication be made" 72- as is required under
Harper & Row and Diversified. Further, the Ampicillin court rejected
the Diversified strict confidentiality requirement, maintaining that
the communicator's intention that the discussion be confidential is
sufficient to retain the privilege. 73
None of the aforementioned tests are fully consonant with the
theoretical underpinnings of the corporate attorney-client privilege.
The control group test ignores modern corporate realities, and thus
ultimately hinders, rather than promotes, consultation with coun-
sel.74 First, many modern corporations are decentralized, delegating
de facto responsibility for corporate action to middle or lower man-
agement, 75 yet such parties are generally not held to be within the
control group. 76  In addition, lower-echelon employees are often the
72. Id. at 385 n.8. It is the relevance of the legal problem to the communication
that is central to this test; to be protected communications must be made in the
reasonable belief that they contain information necessary to the resolution of a legal
problem. Id. at 385 n.10. This test was used without discussion in SEC v. Texas Int'l
Airlines, 29 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 408 (D.D.C. 1979).
73. 81 F.R.D. at 388 (citing Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 37
(D. Md. 1974); City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 205 F. Supp. 830,
831, adhered to, 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa.), mandamus and prohibition denied sub
nom. General Elec. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
372 U.S. 843 (1963)). The Ampicillin court reasoned that communications "which
were believed to be relevant to a particular legal problem," 81 F.R.D. at 387, and
"made with the intention of confidentiality," are privileged. Id. at 388 (emphasis
omitted). As the court noted, "[i]ntent and confidentiality will depend on the cir-
cumstances of the particular case and may require a document-by-document deter-
mination in which the substance of the document may be the only objective indicator
of the client's intention." Id. at 390. Because the Ainpicillin test is based on the
client's intent, and intent is a question of fact, id., under the Ampicillin rationale, all
determinations of whether the attorney-client privilege attaches to corporate em-
ployee communications will depend on the facts of the case.
74. See Kobak, supra note 51, at 365-66; Pye, Fundamentals of the Attorney-
Client Privilege, 15 Prac. Law., Nov. 1969, at 15, 19; Weinschel, supra note 65, at
875-76; Death Knell, supra note 35, 1068-69.
75. See United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223, 1226 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd
on other grounds, 449 U.S. 383 (1981); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d
1224, 1227 (3d Cir. 1979); Coffee, Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoret-
ical View of Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 Va. L. Rev.
1099, 1140 (1977); Weinschel, supra note 65, at 876; Developments in the Law-
Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92
Harv. L. Rev. 1227, 1254 & n.61, 1259 & n.78 (1979); A Suggested Approach, supra
note 12, at 373.
76. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 392 (1981); Duplan Corp. v.
Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1164 (D.S.C. 1974); 2 J. Weinstein & M.
Berger, supra note 12, 503[01], at 503-12 n.1, 503-13.
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ones in a position to know the facts in controversy, 77 yet the attorney
cannot be sure that his communications with these natural spokesmen
will be deemed privileged under the control group test. As the Su-
preme Court noted in Upjohn, the application of the control group
test is unpredictable, in that cases applying the test have made "[d]is-
parate decisions" as to who is a member of the control group.7 8  This
uncertainty is especially problematic in internal investigations. 7  The
policy behind the attorney-client privilege is to foster full and free
communications,80 yet under the control group test the uncertain
protection afforded lower and middle-level employee communications
may force attorneys to interview only less knowledgeable upper man-
agement. Counsel is thus faced with the "Hobson's choice" of garner-
ing all the relevant facts without the benefit of the privilege or of
proceeding without the necessary facts in order to maintain the privi-
lege. 81
Both the Harper & Row and Diversified formulations of the subject
matter test suffer from similar problems. First, if to be privileged
77. Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1164-65 (D.S.C.
1974); see Memorandum of the Chicago Bar Association as Amicus Curiae at 6,
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981). The Chicago Bar Association
argued that "[a]n antitrust case involving allegations of price fixing [cannot] be
defended without the defendant's attorney interviewing the sales personnel, nor
prosecuted without the plaintiff's attorney interviewing the purchasing agents. Simi-
larly, a product design defect case [cannot] be defended without the attorney inter-
viewing the design engineers, nor prosecuted without interviewing the corporate
employees who either bought, serviced or operated the allegedly defective equip-
ment. Rarely will such individuals be members of the control group." Id.
78. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981); see supra notes 53-54.
79. In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litig., 81 F.R.D. 377, 387 (D.D.C. 1978); Pye,
supra note 74, at 19. In Upjohn, for example, the Sixth Circuit held that the privilege
was inapplicable to information gleaned from interviews with lower-level employees
in the course of an internal investigation. United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d
1223, 1227 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 449 U.S. 383 (1981). The dictates of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (adding in part Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §
13(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (1976)), and the voluntary disclosure program of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 10(b),
13(a), 13(b)(2), 14(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78m(a), 78m(b)(2), 78n(a) (1976), require
internal investigations for the protection of the corporation. Thus, it is general
practice that counsel conduct internal investigations upon the discovery of corporate
impropriety. Block & Barton, supra note 16, at 8-9. Counsel can only adequately
conduct such investigations if they have sufficient information. Under the control
group test, counsel is faced with the difficult choice of questioning lower-level
employees without a privilege, or proceeding without the proper data and maintain-
ing the privilege. Weinschel, supra note 65, at 876. See generally Note, Limited
Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege upon the Voluntary Disclosure to the SEC,
50 Fordham L. Rev. 963 (1982) (discussion of waiver problems in the SEC investiga-
tion context).
80. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
81. Weinschel, supra note 65, at 876; see The Control Group Test, supra note 12,
at 427-28.
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communications to counsel must be made at the behest of the employ-
ee's superior, the scope of the privilege is unnecessarily determined by
the question of who is sufficiently superior to direct employees to
communicate with counsel.8 2 In addition, the "scope of the employ-
ee's duties" requirement is susceptible of abuse if interpreted nar-
rowly; an employee's duties should involve a responsibility to help
assure the lawful operation of all elements of the corporation,8 3 rather
than be confined to the performance of duties attendant to his job
title. Second, although the Diversified court addressed the circum-
stance that many persons "beyond those persons who . . . need to
know its contents" are familiar with the matter communicated to
corporate counsel, 4 it used this observation to limit, rather than
extend, the types of communications that could be considered confi-
dential. To hold that such communications would be deemed noncon-
fidential would virtually eliminate the privilege in man) circum-
stances. 5
Although the Ampicillin court succeeded in resolving the confiden-
tiality question by stating that the intention of confidentiality is suffi-
cient to retain the privilege,8 6 the court's approach unnecessarily re-
stricts the nature of employee communications. Corporate counsel are
often required to examine matters that are indirectly related to legal
problems, such as auditing financial records, investigating corporate
activities or recommending future courses of action.87 Particularly in
the context of internal investigations, the Ampicillin "legal problem"
requirement creates a dilemma for corporate counsel: Because coun-
sel can never predict with certainty whether their communications
with corporate employees are sufficiently related to a legal problem,
they may decide to forego such investigations. 8
82. 2 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, supra note 24, § 212, at 566-67; Stern, supra note
51, at 1146. Further, it has been noted that by requiring that the employee's com-
munication to counsel be both at his superior's direction and relate to the duties of his
employment, corporations could protect all communications by authorizing all em-
ployees to report all job-related information to counsel. In re Ampicillin Antitrust
Litig., 81 F.R.D. 377, 386 (D.D.C. 1978).
83. Stern, supra note 51, at 1146.
84. Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 609 (8th Cir. 1978) (en bane)
(adopting the approach of 2 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note 12, 503(b)[04],
at 503-49 to -50).
85. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
86. See supra note 73.
87. Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 610 (8th Cir. 1978) (en bane);
see Simon, supra note 5, at 969; Note, Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer and
Other Professionals: Its Implicationsfor the Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71
Yale L.J. 1226, 1226 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Functional Overlap].
88. The unpredictability problem arising from the Amnpicillin test may have the
same results as the unpredictability problem arising from the control group test. See
supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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Despite these deficiencies, the various subject matter tests better
comport with the conceptual underpinnings of the privilege than does
the control group test, in that they better encourage communications
and focus on the nature of the communication rather than on the
artificial consideration of the title of the communicator.8" Despite
these advantages, however, all three versions unnecessarily restrain
full and free disclosure. Thus, with many inadequate and conflicting
tests, the scope of the corporate attorney-client privilege issue was ripe
for Supreme Court review in Upjohn Co. v. United States.9 0
II. UPJOHN Co. V. UNITED STATES: THE CONSEQUENCES OF
UNCERTAINTY
In choosing among the various standards for measuring the scope of
the attorney-client privilege in the corporate context, the Sixth Cir-
cuit, in United States v. Upjohn Co.,9" rejected the subject matter
test, 92 aligned itself with the proponents of the control group analy-
sis,9 3 and denied Upjohn's claim of privilege. 9' Although commenta-
tors believed that the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the
scope of the privilege issue,95 the Court merely reversed the Sixth
Circuit, 6 rejected the control group test as "difficult to apply in
practice, ' 97 and declined "to lay down a broad rule or series of rules to
89. See 2 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note 12, 503(b)[04], at 503-46 to -47;
Note, The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: The Subject Matter Test v. The
Control Group Test: Will Reasonableness Prevail?-United States v. Upjohn, 5 Del.
J. Corp. L. 480, 496-97 (1980) [hereinafter cited as The Subject Matter Test v. The
Control Group Test]. One commentator noted that the subject matter test of Harper
& Row disregards "the faulty nexus of the control group test." Kobak, supra note 51,
at 367-68.
90. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
91. 600 F.2d 1223 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
92. Id. at 1227. The Sixth Circuit reasoned that the subject matter approach
"goes too far," in that it encourages senior managers to ignore information purposely,
forces corporate counsel to be the "exclusive repository of unpleasant facts," and
"acts as a bar to the discovery of the truth." Id.
93. Id. The Sixth Circuit reasoned that the control group test not only "guards
against undue limitation of evidence," but also promotes consultation with counsel.
Id.
94. Id. at 1227-28. The claim of privilege was denied in part, and part of the case
was remanded to determine who were members of the control group, because the
control group member communications to counsel would be deemed privileged. Id.
95. The Subject Matter Test v. The Control Group Test, supra note 89, at 481;
Alternatives to the Control Group Test, supra note 12, at 478-79.
96. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 402 (1981).
97. Id. at 393. The Court noted that the very concept of a control group suggests
unpredictability given that different courts have included different members in the
group. Id. The Court also found the control group test too narrow to be consistent
with common-law principles. Id. at 397.
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govern all conceivable future questions, " ' on the ground that to
decide anything but the case before it would "violate the spirit of
Federal Rule of Evidence 501."911
The Court argued that the control group test contradicts the policy
underlying the attorney-client privilege. 00 The Court noted that
under the control group analysis, the attorney cannot secure privi-
leged information from middle management and is thus unable to
ascertain the full factual background of a legal problem.'0 ' Further,
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, stated that the control group
test "frustrates the very purpose of the privilege" in that it "makes it
more difficult to convey full and frank legal advice to the [non-control
group] employees who will put into effect the client corporation's
policy." 102
The Upjohn Court based its holding on factual considerations
alone 10 3 and narrowly confined its holding to those facts,104 stating
98. Id. at 386.
99. Id. at 396.
100. See id. at 390. The Court stated that the control group test "overlooks the
fact that the privilege exists to protect not only the giving of professional advice to
those who can act on it but also to the giving of information to the lawyer to enable
him to give sound and informed advice." Id.
101. Id. at 390-91. As the Court noted, the ABA Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity provides that "[a] lawyer. . . be fully informed of all the facts of the matter he is
handling in order for his client to obtain the full advantage of our legal system." Id.
at 391 (quoting Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 4-1 (1979)). The Kutak
Commission's Final Draft of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct left this provi-
sion essentially intact. Model Rules of Professional Conduct rule 1.1 & accompanying
comment (Discussion Draft 1980), reprinted in 67 A.B.A. J. 1299 (1981). In Upjohn,
the Court inferred that use of the control group test is contrary to the mandate of
Ethical Consideration 4-1. 449 U.S. at 391.
102. 449 U.S. at 392; accord Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F.
Supp. 1146, 1164 (D.S.C. 1974).
103. 449 U.S. at 386. In Upjohn, independent accountants, while conducting an
audit of one of the corporation's foreign subsidiaries, discovered a "'slush fund" used
by the subsidiary to bribe foreign officials. Id. This information was reported to
Upjohn's general counsel, id., who, in consultation with outside counsel and the
chairman of the board, decided to conduct an internal investigation" 'to determine
the nature and extent of the questionable payments and to be in a position to give
legal advice to the company with respect to the payments.'" Id. at 394 (quoting
United States v. Upjohn Co., 78-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9277, at 83,599 (W.D.
Mich. Feb. 23, 1978)) (emphasis added by Supreme Court). Pursuant to these inquir-
ies, a questionnaire and letter signed by the chairman was sent to all foreign man-
agers. These managers were instructed to interview employees who might provide
the requested information, and to treat the investigation as "highly confidential." Id.
at 387. The Supreme Court noted that the confidentiality warning was "[clonsistent
with the underlying purposes of the attorney-client privilege." Id. at 395. Further, in
upholding Upjohn's claim of privilege, the Court found that the policy statement
accompanying the questionnaire expressed the intent to secure legal advice. Upjohn
voluntarily submitted detailed information as to $700,000 of "slush fund" expendi-
tures, United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223, 1225 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 449
1200 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50
that the Court sits "to decide concrete cases and not abstract proposi-
tions of law." 0 -5 In addition to rejecting the control group test, the
opinion may be read as implicitly rejecting the various subject matter
tests, 10 6 in that the Court refused to adopt any "broad rule or series of
rules"10 7 even though the facts before it ideally fit the criteria of the
various subject matter tests. 08 Indeed, the Court noted that "no
U.S. 383 (1981), to the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Internal Reve-
nue Service. Id. at 1225. In a subsequent audit of the company's tax returns, the IRS
learned that Upjohn had made illegal payments of approximately $4,400,000 in
many of the 136 foreign countries in which Upjohn does business, id., and conse-
quently issued a summons pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7602 (1976), demanding produc-
tion of all notes and memoranda prepared in the investigation. 449 U.S. at 387-88.
Upjohn refused discovery on the grounds that the communications were privileged
and that the memoranda made pursuant to the investigation were protected by work
product immunity. Id. at 388. For analysis of the relation between the attorney-
client privilege and the work product immunity doctrine, see 2 D. Louisell & C.
Mueller, supra note 24, § 211, at 549-56 (contrasting the two doctrines); Death
Knell, supra note 35, at 1101-03 (concluding that a "record immunity" doctrine
combining both the corporate attorney-client privilege and work product immunity
is preferable to the use of two separate doctrines). Because the Court narrowly
restricted its holding to the facts before it, the decision is of little utility to later courts
seeking to discern corporate attorney-client privilege guidelines. Death Knell, supra
note 35, at 1095; see Baxter Travenol Laboratories, Inc. v. Lemay, 89 F.R.D. 410,
413-14 (S.D. Ohio 1981). But see Stern, supra note 51, at 1146 ("Upjohn has put the
application of the attorney-client privilege as to corporations back on the right
track."); Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to Corporate Clients, 15
Akron L. Rev. 119, 129 (1981) (arguing that the Upjohn analysis supports the
Diversified modified subject matter test).
104. 449 U.S. at 386. The Court stressed that the chairman of the board, in
conjunction with the general counsel/vice president, directed the investigation, that
the content of the letter directing employee cooperation with the investigation indi-
cated the intent to secure legal advice, and that the investigation was deemed
"'highly confidential' " by the chairman. Id. at 394-95.
105. Id. at 386.
106. Baxter Travenol Laboratories, Inc. v. Lemay, 89 F.R.D. 410, 413 (S.D.
Ohio 1981) (The Upjohn Court "did not establish the 'subject matter' test as the
standard by which the scope of corporate attorney-client privileges would be mea-
sured.").
107. 449 U.S. at 386.
108. In Upjohn, the corporate employees' communications (a) concerned matters
within the scope of their employment, and (b) such communications were made at
the direction of the chairman of the board, id. at 394-95, thus meeting the criteria of
the subject matter test as enunciated in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker,
423 F.2d 487, 491-92 (7th Cir. 1970) (per curiam), aff'd mem. by an equally divided
Court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971). The Upjohn facts also meet the criteria set forth in
Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 609 (8th Cir. 1978) (en bane), in that
(a) the chairman of the board directed employees to communicate with counsel, (b)
so that the corporation could seek legal advice, (c) the employees' communications
were within the scope of their corporate duties, (d) were made in order to secure
legal advice, and (e) there was no indication that these communications were dissem-
inated beyond those who needed to know their contents given that the communica-
tions were deemed " 'highly confidential.' " See 449 U.S. at 394-95. Lastly, because
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abstractly formulated and unvarying 'test' will necessarily enable
courts to decide questions such as this with mathematical preci-
sion." 109
Ironically, the Upjohn Court stated that "[a]n uncertain privi-
lege, or one which purports to be certain but results in widely varying
applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at all." 10
But as Chief Justice Burger noted in his concurrence, the majority did
not "clarify aspects of the law of privileges properly before [it]." I
Rather than minimizing the confusion, the Court created even more
uncertainty."12  The absence of any discernible guidelines is likely to
make the task of determining whether communications are privileged
extremely difficult for courts. Indeed, the two post-Upjohn decisions
that deal squarely with the scope of the corporate attorney-client
privilege reflect this confusion. In Baxter Travenol Laboratories, Inc.
v. Lemay,1 3 the District Court for the Southern District of Ohio
stated that "one searches the [Upjohn] Court's Opinion in vain for
some substituted guideline which might enhance the predictability of
the privilege.""14 Rather than applying any analytical test to deter-
mine the existence of the privilege, the Baxter court compared the
(a) the communications to counsel were made to secure legal advice, (b) the employ-
ees "were sufficiently aware that they were being questioned in order that the
corporation could obtain legal advice," (c) the communications related to the scope
of the employees' duties, and (d) were" 'highly confidential,' " id., the Upiohn facts
also meet the criteria in In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litig., 81 F.R.D. 377, 385
(D.D.C. 1978).
109. 449 U.S. at 393.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 403-04 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment). Chief Justice Burger criticized the majority's failure to establish guidelines,
and set forth his own alternative test to discern the scope of the corporate attorney-
client privilege. Id. at 402-03.
112. In his concurrence, Chief Justice Burger noted that the majority's statement
that the failure to establish guidelines " 'may to some slight extent undermine
desirable certainty' . . . neither minimizes the consequences of continuing uncer-
tainty and confusion nor harmonizes the inherent dissonance of acknowledging that
uncertainty while declining to clarify it within the frame of issues presented." Id. at
404 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
113. 89 F.R.D. 410 (S.D. Ohio 1981). In Baxter, the defendants left the plaintiffs'
employ and established a competing business. In response, the plaintiffs brought suit
for the defendants' breach of their employment contracts, breach of their fiduciary
duties and for wrongful appropriation of the plaintiffs' confidential information.
One of these former employees, Warnick, was hired to act as a litigation consultant
by the plaintiff corporation, and informed plaintiffs' counsel of the details of the
defendants' misappropriation of plaintiff's business secrets. When the defendants
sought discovery of Warnick's disclosures, the plaintiffs refused, claiming the protec-
tion of the attorney-client privilege. Id. at 412. The court upheld the claim of
privilege. Id. at 414.
114. Id. at 413.
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facts before it with those in Upjohn, finding that because the same
"operative factors" existed, the privilege must be granted." 5 In In re
LTV Securities Litigation,"' the District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Texas also based its holding on the similarity of the facts before
it to those in Upjohn." 7 Although these two courts found the facts in
the cases before them similar to those in Upjohn, the unique facts in
Upjohn make the case easily distinguishable. If, in the future, courts
are to base their decisions on comparisons to Upjohn, roughly similar
facts may serve as a pretext for a court to compel disclosure when so
inclined. Upjohn's obfuscation of the scope of the corporate attorney-
client privilege also hinders counsel's ability to advise corporate cli-
ents. Without any discernible judicial guidelines, the attorney's ability
to predict whether communications will be privileged virtually disap-
pears."" The scope of the privilege determination may rest on
whether the facts of a case are similar to those of Upjohn or on which
test is employed by the forum eventually chosen." 9 Accordingly, a
more substantive set of guidelines must be established.
III. THE TENSION BETWEEN PRIVILEGE AND DiscovERY Ruis
In attempting to fashion a corporate privilege rule, the judiciary
has struggled to strike a balance between the policies underlying the
privilege and those supporting liberalized discovery. 20 The attorney-
client privilege is designed to facilitate a full and frank exchange of
115. Id. at 413-14. The Baxter court defined the "operative factors" as "those
considerations upon which the Supreme Court expressly found warranted the conclu-
sion that the attorney-client privilege extended to communications from Upjohn's
lower-echelon employees to Upjohn's counsel." Id. at 413.
116. 89 F.R.D. 595 (N.D. Tex. 1981). In LTV, the buyers and sellers of various
LTV securities brought a securities fraud class action suit against the corporation,
following an internal investigation by the corporation in response to SEC subpoenas.
The class sought disclosure of documents related to the SEC investigation. The
corporate defendant refused on privilege grounds. Id. at 598. The claim of privilege
was upheld. Id. at 621.
117. Id. at 602. The LTV court placed great emphasis on the intent to garner legal
advice, stating that "the focal point [of the privilege] is the purpose of the lawyer in
gathering the data." Id. at 603.
118. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981); Block & Barton,
supra note 16, at 17; Alternatives to the Control Group Test, supra note 12, at 481.
119. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
120. See, e.g., United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223, 1227 (6th Cir. 1979),
rev'd on other grounds, 449 U.S. 383 (1981); Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572
F.2d 596, 602 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Goldfarb, 328 F.2d 280, 282 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 976 (1964); Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas
Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 323 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963); In re LTV Sec.
Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 600 (N.D. Tex. 1981); see C. McCormick, supra note 21, § 96,
at 202-03; 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 2, § 2291, at 554; Radin, supra note 17, at 491.
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information between an attorney and his client121 and has been
deemed "the most important testimonial privilege."I- The policy
behind the privilege fully applies to corporate communications; 1
"the group of agents and directors who motivate a corporation need
the incentive of the privilege fully as much as do private clients to
encourage full disclosure to counsel." 1 24
Because "the privilege remains an exception to the general duty to
disclose," 125 many courts and commentators have contended that the
attorney-client privilege is antithetical to the aims of liberalized dis-
covery. 126 Courts have expressed the fear that a broad privilege rule
would create a "zone of silence" over corporate affairs, immunizing
all information disclosed by employees from discovery. 2 7 Further,
This Note argues, however, that the theoretical underpinnings of the privilege and
discovery rules are not entirely inconsistent. See infra notes 129-36 and accompany-
ing text.
121. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
122. 2 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, supra note 24, § 207, at 504.
123. E.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 390 (1981); United States v.
Louisville & N.R.R., 236 U.S. 318, 336 (1915);*Weil Inv. Indicators, Research &
Mgmt., Inc., 647 F.2d 18, 23 (9th Cir. 1981); Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572
F.2d 596, 608 (8th Cir. 1978) (en bane); Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093,
1097 & n.10 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971); United States v.
Bartone, 400 F.2d 459, 461 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1027 (1969). The
only case to renounce the corporate privilege, Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas
Ass'n, 207 F. Supp. 771, adhered to, 209 F. Supp. 321 (N.D. I11. 1962), was
emphatically reversed by the Seventh Circuit, on the grounds that "based on history,
principle, precedent and public policy the attorney-client privilege in its broad sense
is available to corporations." Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d
314, 323 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963). The attorney-client privilege
also applies to other non-individual clients such as trade associations, Westinghouse
Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
955 (1978), governmental bodies, Hearn v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 574, 579 (E.D. Wash.
1975); Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Shields, 18 F.R.D. 448, 450 (S.D.N.Y.
1955), administrative agencies, Cogdill v. TVA, 7 F.R.D. 411, 414 (E.D. Tenn.
1947), and "a partnership . . . , [a] transitory joint venture .... a tenant's associa-
tion, a property owners' association, a boy scout troop or a political club or inchoate
labor union." 2 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note 12, 503(a)(1)[01], at 503-18.
124. The Lawyer-Client Privilege, supra note 5, at 241; accord D.I. Chadbourne,
Inc. v. Superior Court, 60 Cal. 2d 723, 736, 388 P.2d 700, 709, 36 Cal. Rptr. 468,
477 (1964) (en banc) ("Certainly the public policy behind the attorney-client privi-
lege requires that an artificial person be given equal opportunity with a natural
person to communicate with its attorney.").
125. 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 2, § 2291, at 554.
126. See sources cited supra note 120.
127. United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223, 1227 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd on
other grounds, 449 U.S. 383 (1981); Jarvis, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 84
F.R.D. 286, 291-92 (D. Colo. 1979); In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litig., 81 F.R.D.
377, 387 (D.D.C. 1978); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146,
1163 (D.S.C. 1974); see Simon, supra note 5, at 955-56; Note, Privileged Communi-
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commentators have argued that if the scope of the privilege were
expanded, it would be difficult for an adversary to ferret out informa-
tion during discovery. 128
These arguments ignore the fact that privileged information is often
discoverable elsewhere. The privilege protects only disclosure of com-
munications, not disclosure of the underlying facts communicated to
the attorney. 129 Under the discovery rules, 30 when a party seeks to
depose a corporation, the corporation must designate a person to
"testify as to matters known or reasonably available to the organiza-
tion." 31 A party faced with a claim of privilege is then free to depose
this designated person as well as other employees to obtain discovery
regarding any facts "relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action." 1 32 While opponents of the privilege maintain that it
would be far easier to subpoena all attorney records, 133 the Upjohn
Court correctly noted that " '[d]iscovery was hardly intended to en-
able a learned profession to perform its functions ...on wits bor-
rowed from the adversary.' 1134 Convenience cannot serve as a basis
to override the privilege.
Moreover, opponents of liberalized privilege rules fail to recognize
that the policy rationales behind the privilege and discovery rules are
cations-Inroads on the Control Group Test in the Corporate Area, 22 Syracuse L.
Rev. 759, 766 (1971).
128. Gardner, A Personal Privilege for Communications of Corporate Clients-
Paradox or Public Policy?, 40 U. Det. L.J. 299, 344 (1963) (Gardner II); The Control
Group Test, supra note 12, at 427.
129. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395-96 (1981); Diversified Indus.
v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1978) (en bane); Baxter Travenol Laborato-
ries, Inc. v. Lemay, 89 F.R.D. 410, 415 (S.D. Ohio 1981); City of Philadelphia v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 205 F. Supp. 830, 831, adhered to, 210 F. Supp. 483
(E.D. Pa.), mandamus and prohibition denied sub nom. General Elec. Co. v.
Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963); 2 J.
Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note 12, 503(a)(4)[01]-(b)[03], at 503-29 to -41.
130. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26-37; see supra note 35.
131. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 31(a) employs the
same criteria for depositions upon written questions. Id. 31(a).
132. Id. 26(b)(1); accord Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th
Cir. 1978) (en bane); In re LTV See. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 608 (N.D. Tex. 1981); 4A
J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice 33.07, at 33-41, 33.20, at 33-99 (3d ed. 1981).
The privilege belongs to the corporation, and the employee-defendant cannot claim
the privilege to protect his own disclosures to corporate counsel made in the further-
ance of seeking legal advice for the corporation. See Diversified Indus. v. Meredith,
572 F.2d 596, 611 n.5 (8th Cir. 1978) (en bane).
133. See The Control Group Test, supra note 12, at 427 & n.14.
134. 449 U.S. at 396 (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 516 (1947)
(Jackson, J. concurring)); see Sterk, Testimonial Privileges: An Analysis of Horizontal
Choice of Law Problems, 61 Minn. L. Rev. 461, 468 (1977) ("[I]t would be unjust In
an adversary system to allow one party to force the opposing lawyer to disclose
damaging admissions made by his client.").
1204 (Vol. 50
1982] CORPORATE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE 1205
not necessarily antithetical. The overriding aim of discovery, ensuring
the "fair and open adjudication of controversies," largely depends on
"the industry and efficiency of counsel."' 35 A restrictive interpreta-
tion of the attorney-client privilege makes counsel wary of gathering
all relevant information for fear that it may be used against his
client. 13  Thus, such an interpretation may prevent counsel from
adequately representing his client, and therefore impedes, rather than
promotes, the "fair" adjudication of controversies.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION
Because the liberalization of privilege rules would not substantially
impede discovery, the scope of the attorney-client privilege must be
reassessed. Instead of choosing between the alternative tests currently
employed by courts to determine whether the communications of
particular employees are privileged, the privilege should apply to
communications of all corporate employees.
Given that the attorney-client privilege may be used to frustrate
discovery if used improperly, the proposed rule that the privilege
apply to the communications of all corporate employees is susceptible
of abuse if it is not circumscribed. It is proposed that the party
asserting the privilege must sustain the burden of proof on certain
narrow issues. 137 The claim of privilege should be granted only when
135. Death Knell, supra note 35, at 1052-53.
136. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
137. The burden of proof is usually said to rest with the party asserting the
privilege. United States v. Landof, 591 F.2d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1978); Union Planters
Nat'l Bank v. ABC Records, Inc., 82 F.R.D. 472, 475 (WV.D. Tenn. 1979); Perrignon
v. Bergen Brunswig Corp., 77 F.R.D. 455, 457 n.1 (N.D. Cal. 1978); D.I. Chad-
bourne, Inc. v. Superior Court, 60 Cal. 2d 723, 729, 388 P.2d 700, 704, 36 Cal. Rptr.
468, 472 (1964) (en banc). Therefore, a party asserting the privilege must establish
that the counsel to whom the communication was made was an attorney hired to
represent the corporation,.present some description of the type of disclosure claimed
to be privileged and show that the attorney was not consulted for purely economic or
business reasons. Given that the ultimate purpose of the privilege is to encourage the
professional relationship, purely non-legal communications should not be protected
from disclosure. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59
(D. Mass. 1950); see United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1044 (5th Cir.) (business
advice and the attorney's personal business transactions are not covered by the
privilege), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 320 (1981); Functional Overlap, supra note 87, at
1250 (purely business advice is not protected by the attorney-client privilege). There-
fore, if an attorney acted solely in the capacity of a business adviser, see, e.g., United
States v. Rosenstein, 474 F.2d 705, 714-15 (2d Cir. 1973) (letters from attorney
directing client to enter into a business deal were not privileged); Lowy' v. Commis-
sioner, 262 F.2d 809, 812 (2d Cir. 1959) (attorney's actions as business associate not
privileged); United States v. Vehicular Parking, Ltd., 52 F. Supp. 751, 753 (D. Del.
1943) (letters of an attorney acting as a business manager not privileged), corporate
director or officer, see, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings of Browning Arms Co.,
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the corporation can show that (A) the employee communicating the
information was not a "fortuitous witness," and (B) that the employee
did not intend to waive the privilege.13
A. The Fortuitous Witness Exception
Given the large numbers of employees in some modern corpora-
tions, it is possible that by pure chance an employee might witness
events involving the corporation that have no relationship to his em-
ployment. For instance, in Hickman v. Taylor, 39 crew members who
survived a tug boat accident and who happened to be employees of
the tug's owner were interviewed by their employer's counsel as to the
cause of the accident.140  The Supreme Court noted that these inter-
views were with bystander "witnesses," and asserted that their com-
munications with their employer's counsel were not privileged.14 1
528 F.2d 1301, 1303 (8th Cir. 1976) (communications to an attorney on board of
directors not privileged); SEC v. Gulf & W. Indus., 518 F. Supp. 675, 683 (D.D.C.
1981) (information received by an attorney in his role as corporate director not
privileged); but cf. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 386 (1981) (informa-
tion garnered from internal investigation by general counsel/vice president held
privileged), or an accountant, see, e.g., United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 922 (2d
Cir. 1961) (accounting service sought from an attorney not privileged); Olender v.
United States, 210 F.2d 795, 805-06 (9th Cir. 1954) (same); In re Shapiro, 381 F.
Supp. 21, 22 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (same), the communications with corporate employees
would not be privileged. The courts have denied the privilege in many other circum-
stances in which attorneys did not act as legal advisors. See, e.g., United States v.
Bartone, 400 F.2d 459, 461 (6th Cir. 1968) (attorney's fund-tracing services not
privileged), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1027 (1969); Canaday v. United States, 354 F.2d
849, 857 (8th Cir. 1966) (attorney acting "merely as a scrivener"); Modern Woodmen
of Am. v. Watkins, 132 F.2d 352, 354 (5th Cir. 1942) (attorney acting as a friend);
Radio Corp. of Am. v. Rauland Corp., 18 F.R.D. 440, 444 (N.D. I11. 1955) (attorney
acting as a negotiator between corporations); cf. Hercules Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434
F. Supp. 136, 146 (D. Del. 1977) (attorney-client privilege does not protect the
results of research, tests, experiments and other technical information communicated
to the attorney).
138. It is a basic principle of attorney-client privilege law that communications to
counsel in furtherance of a future crime or fraud are not privileged. Clark v. United
States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (FMC Corp.), 604 F.2d
798, 802 (3d Cir. 1979); SEC v. Gulf & W. Indus., 518 F. Supp. 675, 680 (D.D.C.
1981); C. McCormick, supra note 21, § 95. It is the client's intention that the
communication be in furtherance of the crime or fraud which controls, regardless of
whether the attorney was cognizant of his client's purpose. In re Grand Jury Proceed-
ings (FMC Corp.), 604 F.2d 798, 802 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Calvert, 523
F.2d 895, 909 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 911 (1976); United States v.
Aldridge, 484 F.2d 655, 658 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 922 (1974).
139. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
140. Id. at 498.
141. Id. at 508 (dictum); accord General Counsel v. United States, 599 F.2d 504,
510 (2d Cir. 1979); Baxter Travenol Laboratories, Inc. v. Lemay, 89 F.R.D. 410,
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To comply with the Hickman v. Taylor rule, therefore, it is neces-
sary to carve out a fortuitous witness exception to the rule of privi-
lege. 42  It should be noted, however, that this exception is exceed-
ingly narrow, applying only to bystander witnesses who, by mere
happenstance, are also corporate employees. Further expansion of the
Hickman rule to employees communicating information relevant to
the direct scope of their employment 14 3 raises the spectre of a privilege
defined by job title as in the control group test denounced in Up-
john. 144
B. The Waiver Exception
Although the concepts of confidentiality and waiver are generally
treated as distinct, 45 they overlap in one very significant area: If the
client breaches the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship
by revealing the communication to third parties, the privilege is
waived. 146  Traditionally, courts and commentators seeking severe
restriction of the privilege advocate a strict standard of waiver, pro-
viding that any disclosure of confidential information, even if inad-
vertent, would end the privilege. 47 In the corporate context, such a
414 (S.D. Ohio 1981); D.I. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior Court. 60 Cal. 2d 723,
737, 388 P.2d 700, 709, 36 Cal. Rptr. 468, 477 (1964) (en banc).
142. The distinction between a communication made by a corporate employee
qua employee and a mere witness has been referred to as both the -'fortuitous
witness" problem, The Subject Matter Test v. The Control Group Test, supra note
89, at 483-84, and the "bystander witness" problem. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc.
v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 491 (7th Cir. 1970) (per curiam), aff'd iner. by an equally
divided Court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971).
143. The scope of the employee's employment requirement is one part of the
subject matter test. Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 609 (8th Cir. 1978)
(en banc); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 491-92 (7th Cir.
1970) (per curiam), af''d mem. by an equally divided Court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971).
For criticisms of this approach, see supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
144. 449 U.S. at 393.
145. See 8 J. Wigmore. supra note 2, § 2292, at 554, § 2327, at 634: Block &
Barton, supra note 16, at 5: Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 503, 511 (final revised draft), 56
F.R.D. 183, 235-37, 258 (1972). But see Block & Barton, supra note 16, at 17-21
(concepts discussed together).
146. The attorney-client privilege belongs to the client, In re Grand Jury Proceed-
ings (FMC Corp.), 604 F.2d 798, 801 (3d Cir. 1979): Garner v. Volfinbarger, 430
F.2d 1093, 1096 & 1097 n.7 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971);
Republic Gear Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 381 F.2d 551, 556 (2d Cir. 1967); Tillot-
son v. Boughner, 350 F.2d 663, 665 (7th Cir. 1965), and accordingly, only the client
may waive it. Republic Gear Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 381 F.2d 551, 556 (2d Cir.
1967); Perrignon v. Bergen Brunswig Corp., 77 F.R.D. 455, 459-60 (N.D. Cal.
1978).
147. Under traditional waiver theories, the presence of disinterested third parties,
8 J. Wigmore, supra note 2, §§ 2311, 2327; The Lawyer-Client Privilege, supra note
5, at 238, or voluntary disclosure of the communication to a third party, Permian
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strict standard would pose a significant problem: If information con-
tained in the communication is widely known throughout the corpo-
rate structure, it would be held to lose its confidentiality, and the
privilege would be waived. 14
This Note proposes the adoption of the confidentiality test as enun-
ciated in In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation149 to govern waiver
problems. Under the Ampicillin rationale, to be privileged, only the
employee's communication need be confidential, not the underlying
facts disclosed to the attorney. Further, the communication need only
be made with the intention of confidentiality, and therefore another
employee's knowledge of the communication does not necessarily
waive the privilege.15
Because this Note proposes that the privilege apply to communica-
tions of all corporate employees, however, it is possible that any
employee could waive the privilege for the corporation if he intention-
ally reveals the communication to a third party. Thus, corporate
counsel should strongly caution all employees with whom he commu-
nicates not to disclose the communication, for any intentional disclo-
sure of the communication to third parties will waive the privilege for
the entire corporation.
Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United States v.
Aronoff, 466 F. Supp. 855, 862 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), or dissemination of the communica-
tion beyond the corporate employees who need to know the contents of that com-
munication, automatically waives the privilege. Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572
F.2d 596, 609 (8th Cir. 1978) (en bane); SECv. Gulf & W. Indus., 518 F. Supp. 675,
681 (D.D.C. 1981); cf. Jarvis, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 84 F.R.D. 286, 292
(D. Colo. 1979) (privilege not allowed when documents in question may be routinely
reviewed by employees).
148. Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 609 (8th Cir. 1978) (en bane).
Although some modern courts have modified the traditional waiver approach, hold-
ing that the intent to disclose, rather than the disclosure itself, should be the linchpin
of waiver, see United States v. Bump, 605 F.2d 548, 550-51 (10th Cir. 1979); United
States v. Bigos, 459 F.2d 639, 643 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 847 (1972),
United States v. Woodall, 438 F.2d 1317, 1324 (5th Cir. 1971) (en bane), it is likely
that the use of an "intent to disclose" theory would not, by itself, obviate the waiver
problem in the corporate context. A court inclined to deny the privilege could find
that, because the underlying facts of the communication are widely known through-
out the corporate structure, it may be inferred that the corporation does not intend
that the information be confidential, and therefore indicates intent to waive the
privilege.
149. 81 F.R.D. 377, 389-90 (D.D.C. 1978).
150. Id. at 388-89. The Ampicillin court stated that "the most appropriate
[means] . . . of encouraging individuals to speak freely to their attorneys . . . is to
require only that the communication be confidential." Id. at 390 (emphasis in
original). The court reasoned that if by virtue of a third party's knowledge of the
communication the privilege could be waived, "it would be the rare communication
that would be protected and, in turn, it would be the rare client who would freely
communicate to an attorney." Id.
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The approach suggested in this Note-that the communications of
all corporate employees be privileged-better comports with the theo-
retical underpinnings of the privilege than do any of the tests adopted
by the courts. The courts' use of either the control group or the various
subject matter tests restricts the scope of the privilege on the ground
that it poses an "obstacle to the investigation of the truth."151  Such
strict construction of the privilege, however, unnecessarily hinders the
truth-finding process in internal investigations. Only a standard, such
as the one proposed in this Note, which gives the widest berth to the
privilege and establishes a standard of certainty will promote full and
frank communication between attorneys and their clients.
CONCLUSION
The concept of attorney-client privilege recognizes that full and free
communication between attorneys and their clients ultimately facili-
tates justice. In the corporate context, however, courts have restricted
the scope of the privilege in an attempt to balance it with discovery
practices. The result of this balancing process is a myriad of confusing
tests that misapprehend the policies underlying both privilege and
discovery rules, and which deprive corporate counsel of predictability
in their attorney-client relationships. A rule that the communications
of all of a corporation's employees be privileged, tempered by limited
exceptions, will better promote confident and efficient attorney-client
relations and benefit the adversary system as a whole.
Jacqueline A. Weiss
151. Id. at 384; see United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223, 1227 (6th Cir.
1979), rev'd on other grounds, 449 U.S. 383 (1981): Diversified Indus. v. Meredith,
572 F.2d 596, 602 (8th Cir. 1977). Accordingly, many courts have called for a strict
construction of the privilege. E.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings (FMC Corp.), 604
F.2d 798, 802-03 (3d Cir. 1979); In re LTV See. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 600 (N.D.
Tex. 1981); Cohen v. Uniroyal, Inc., 80 F.R.D. 480, 483 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Underwa-
ter Storage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. 546, 547-48 (D.D.C.
1970). But see Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1100 (5th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971).
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